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Abstract.  
We develop a dynamic investment options framework with optimal capital structure and 
analyze the effect of debt maturity. We find that in the absence of financing constraints 
short-term debt maximizes firm value. In contrast with most literature results, in the 
absence of constraints, higher volatility may increase initial debt for firms with low initial 
revenues, issuing long term debt that expires after the investment option maturity. This 
effect, which is due to the option value of receiving the value of assets and remaining tax 
savings, does not hold for short term debt and firms with high profitability, where an 
increase in volatility reduces the firm value. The importance of short-term debt is reduced 
in the presence of non-negative equity net worth or debt financing constraints and firms 
behave more conservatively in the use of initial debt. With non-negative equity net worth, 
higher volatility has adverse effects on the firm value, while with debt financing 
constraints higher volatility may enhance firm value for firms with relatively low revenue 
that have out-of-the-money investment options. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Understanding firms’ dynamic investment and financing decisions is a central 
issue of corporate finance. Recent theoretical developments in corporate finance have 
provided a unified framework for the analysis of investment and financing decisions of 
the firm. A recent example is Sundaresan and Wang (2007) who develop a two-stage 
investment valuation with two sequential debt issues. They provide insights on the 
interaction between investment and financing decisions, discussing debt overhang and 
leverage choices of firms in the presence of growth options. Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) 
use a similar dynamic model to analyze the joint choice of debt priority and capital 
structure with an expansion option. These papers build on trade-off theory extending 
Leland (1994) and are developed in a continuous time framework.1 In this paper we 
develop a comprehensive model along the lines of this literature. Our first contribution is 
to develop a computational lattice-based methodology that extends Broadie and Kaya 
(2007) by allowing for optimal capital structure, multiple debt issues with finite 
maturities and different priority rules, and multiple investment option stages. Our further 
contribution is that our model allows the analysis of the effect of debt maturity in the 
presence of multiple investment stages. While in the absence of debt or equity constraints 
short-term debt is preferred, we show that financing constraints may have a significant 
impact on firms using short-term debt, thus explaining the possible choice of long-term 
debt by many firms.  
In the absence of financing constraints we find that firms optimally borrow more 
heavily when debt maturity is short and firm values are higher than in the long term debt 
                                                 
1 Earlier examples also include Mauer and Sarkar (2005) who consider a single investment option. 
4 
 
case, because short term debt enables firms to accelerate the receipt of tax benefits of 
debt. This is line with Agliardi and Koussis (2013) who find that short-term debt is 
optimal when there is no principal (like in the case of bank loans) and long-term debt is 
optimal in the case of bonds (where principal is due) similarly to Leland and Toft (1996) 
who also find a similar result in the absence of agency problems. Myers (1977) has first 
suggested that firms with growth options may optimally use short term debt that expires 
before the exercise of investment opportunities. Our results are consistent with empirical 
evidence by Altman, Gande and Saunders (2010) and Rauh and Sufi (2008) who find that 
firms use short term bank loans more than longer term bonds and McKay (2003) who 
finds higher leverage ratios for firms using shorter term debt.  
Our investigation of the determinants of long-term debt in the absence of 
financing constraints reveals that with long term debt an increase in volatility may result 
in an increase in initial debt values. This result, although appearing counterintuitive, is in 
line with Bhagat et. al. (2009) who find that leverage is increasing with earnings risk 
when firms employ long-term debt.2 We show that this holds since an increase in 
volatility yields an enhanced option value to obtain not only the value of unlevered 
assets, but also the remaining tax benefits of debt since debt expires after the investment 
option is exercised. In contrast, for short-term debt that expires prior to the investment 
option exercise, an increase in volatility results in a decrease in initial debt levels.  
We also investigate the effect of competitive erosion, which results in a reduction 
in initial and subsequent debt levels, while an increase in the expansion factor of growth 
                                                 
2 Fan et al. (2012) show that in most countries there is a positive association between market-to-book and 
long term debt use (in the US the relationship is negative as also shown in Barclay and Smith, 1995 in an 
earlier study). Often, high market-to-book (growth) firms are associated with higher volatility, however, 
there several other factors that may drive market-to-book. An explicit treatment of volatility may be more 
effectively test the impact on the maturity structure of debt.    
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options or a reduction in investment costs results in enhanced debt values. These results 
hold for both long term and short term debt. However, we observe that leverage ratios 
have a U-shape in the long term debt case, but are decreasing in the short term debt case 
with respect to the expansion factor and the investment costs. The U-shape relationship of 
growth options (expansion factors and investment) with leverage was also recently 
demonstrated in Hackbarth and Mauer (2012).  In contrast, we find that in the case of 
short term debt, leverage ratios are strictly decreasing in the level of the expansion factor 
and the investment costs.   
We investigate whether the presence of financing constraints may reduce the 
preference for short-term debt. Our focus on financing constraints is based on the 
observation that optimal coupon choices in the case of short-term debt often exceed firm 
revenue levels at the time of debt initiation. It is thus possible that the risk of negative 
equity net worth or the reluctance of debt holders to provide financing unless coupon 
levels are below revenue levels at debt initiation may explain the choice of long term 
debt. Our argument is supported by alternative theoretical models provided by Childs et 
al. (2005) and Ju and Yang (2006) who show the problems of liquidity risk, refinancing 
risk and transaction costs for short-term debt. Our focus on financing constraints is also 
reinforced by the extensive empirical literature documenting the existence of financing 
constraints (see for example, Campello, Graham and Harvey, 2010, Rauh, 2006, Whited 
and Wu, 2006, Hubbard et al., 1995 and Whited, 1992). Limited debt capacity and other 
forms of financing constraints have also been incorporated in recent tests of capital 
structure theories (see Lemmon and Zender, 2010). Gomes et al. (2006) show that debt 
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constraints represent a risk factor of firm returns3.  In our model debt constraints are 
modeled by imposing a ceiling on the level of debt installment based on the revenue 
levels at the times of the decision to lend. Effectively, this imposes a constraint on the 
level of debt which is connected to the financial conditions of the firm at the time of debt 
issue. By adding realistic debt financing constraints levels on short-term levels of coupon 
we find a significant negative impact on firm values which may indeed justify the use of 
long term debt. Yang (2011) models debt constraints by imposing a cost which equity 
holders have to pay when issuing debt, which captures the monitoring and enforcement 
cost of repayment risky debt. Furthermore, in contrast to Yang (2011), where debt is 
repaid in the next period following the issue, in our model debt maturity is flexible and 
we allow for multiple debt issues.  
Besides debt financing constraints, firms may also face equity financing 
constraints.4 Uhrig-Homburg (2005) explores costly equity issue that can lead to a cash 
flow shortage restriction. Hubbard and Kashyap (1992) explain that low net worth may 
induce or exasperate debt financing constraints. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show how 
the variation in net worth creates firm financing constraints in a model of the overall 
economy with business cycles. A common empirical result of these and related work is 
an inverse relationship between the premium (cost) of external financing and the firm’s 
net worth (Schiantarelli, 1996). In contrast to these models, we employ a structural model  
to capture net worth constraints. The structural approach allows us to explicitly consider 
                                                 
3 Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010) and Koussis and Martzoukos (2011) analyze the impact of exogenous debt 
constraints on the timing of investment, showing a U-shape pattern of the investment threshold and leverage levels 
(empirical support for a U-shaped relation between internal funds and investment for financially constrained firms is 
detailed in Cleary at al., 2007). Titman et al. (2004) investigate the impact of financing constraints on default spreads 
and Lensik and Sterken (2002) discuss conditions under which credit rationing by banks may apply in a real option 
model 
4 Liquidity constraints may also affect the firm’s investment decisions (see, for example, Morellec, 2001, Boyle and 
Guthrie, 2003, Whited, 1992, Cleary et al., 2007 and Hugonnier, Malamud and Morellec, 2012). We do not explore 
issues of liquidity in this paper.  
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the investment option and the role of volatility and default risk.  Equity constraints are 
modeled by imposing a non-negative equity net worth constraint which captures the 
difficulties in raising external financing in bad times in line with the above literature. Our 
equity net-worth constraint is different from the equity financing constraint of Yang 
(2011). In his model, equity constraints impose a non-negative dividend restriction, 
which implies that no new equity can be issued at any time. In contrast, in our model 
equity financing is possible; however, when equity worth becomes negative we assume it 
is no longer possible for the firm to obtain new financing, and thus the firm defaults.     
With non-negative equity net worth constraints the firm’s choice of short-term 
debt is reduced in order to mitigate the possibility of future negative net worth as revenue 
uncertainty unfolds. However, non-negative equity net worth constraints alone are 
insufficient to reduce firm values enough to justify the use of long-term debt. In contrast, 
for plausible levels of debt constraints, and confirming the empirical evidence of Yang 
(2011), we find that debt constraints are more significantly affecting firm values, thus 
providing a more plausible explanation firms using long term debt. Finally, we report two 
interesting results with respect to the effect of revenue volatility in the presence of 
financing constraints. In the presence of non-negative equity net worth constraints, an 
increase in volatility hurts firm value by decreasing both the value of unlevered assets 
and the tax benefits of debt. However, with debt financing constraints higher volatility 
may enhance firm value for low revenue (out-of-the money options) by increasing the 
option value component of firm value.  For firms with high revenue (in-the-money 
options), an increase in volatility has little impact on firm values in the presence of debt 
financing constraints. 
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The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, 
Section 3 presents the numerical results and Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. The model 
 
We assume that revenue P at t is a variable that follows a geometric Brownian motion of 
the form:  
                                              t
t
t dZadt
P
dP
σ+=                                                                    
where α ,  σ  > 0 are constant parameters and dZt is the increment of a standard Wiener 
process. The firm pays an operational cost C  so that total earnings before interest and 
taxes at time t is Pt - C. The firm decides whether to exercise its investment option at time 
1T  by paying an irreversible fixed cost I1 and choosing a mix of debt )(1 PD  and equity 
( )(11 PDI − ) to finance the investment cost.  At investment, the equity holders receive a 
levered equity position denoted by )(1 PE . The firm has a useful life (firm maturity) FT  
relative to the first investment stage. After the first investment stage, subsequent 
investment stages may follow with maturities iT , Si ,...3,2=  relative to the prior stage 
(so the maturity horizon for the i  option is the accumulated time iTTT ...21 ++ ). At each 
investment stage the firm may decide to issue new debt and rebalance its capital 
structure.5 Debt issue i  demands a tax-deductible coupon payment iR  per period and a 
                                                 
5  We assume that existing debt cannot be repaid early at this stage so the firm has the option only to increase its debt 
usage.  
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final principal debt (face value) iF  at maturity. Debt maturity for each debt issue is 
specified by 
iDT  with FD TT ≤1 , )( 212 TTTT FD +−≤ , )( 3213 TTTTT FD ++−≤  etc.  
In order to accommodate the choice of different coupon levels at each investment 
stage, we employ a forward-backward algorithm. The algorithm proceeds by first 
creating the pre-investment stage tree with 1N  steps. At each price level at the end nodes 
of the first investment stage, several lattices are created that capture the next operational 
phase and default decisions conditional on the choice of the coupon level. Coupon levels 
at stage i depend on the level of revenues Pi at each state which is discretized through the 
choice of Cn  points and the use of a maximum of maxc  points. This implies the following 
dynamically created coupon grids: 
                                         },....2,1,0{ max i
ccc
i Pn
cP
n
P
n
coupon ⋅⋅=  
Figure 1 illustrates (using a two-stage example) how the lattice algorithm is applied for 
multiple investment stages and multiple debt issues. The operational phase is initiated at 
the time of the first investment maturity T1 and is assumed to have duration of FT  
periods. It may however be terminated if operational costs or coupon payments cause the 
firm to default (we explain endogenous default decisions in greater detail below). 
Operations may also be terminated at the subsequent investment stages if the firm decides 
not to proceed with new investment. At the end of the first investment horizon, a first 
debt issue can be made. At this stage, the first coupon selection process starts with new 
lattice trees created. Depending on the maturity of the first debt issue, the coupon 
payments may continue after the second investment stage (or the third if one exists). At 
the time of the second investment stage, the firm may decide on a new debt issue. At this 
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stage, a new coupon search process will start conditional on the earlier coupon selection. 
The coupon grid for the second debt issue will depend on the level of revenue reached. 
Similarly with the first debt issue, the debt maturity of the second option may or may not 
overlap with other stages and should mature before or at the end of the operational phase 
of the firm.  
  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Investment stages are approximated by lattices with sizes that are defined relative 
to the tree used for the pre-investment stage, which is used as benchmark. Denoting the 
pre-investment stage with 1N , the size of the i  subsequent interval ( ,...3,2=i ) will thus 
be 1
1
N
T
T
N ii ⋅





= . The last period (after ST ) is approximated by 
1
1
1
1
121 )...( N
T
T
N
T
TTTT
N SSFF 





=⋅




 ++−
= − .  
 
If new investment leads to expansion of revenues, then this is modeled using Seee ..., 21  
expansion factors multiplying the revenue variable. The revenue level at stage i  equals 
)...( 21 ieee +  times the revenue of that stage. When investments do not expand cash flows 
the expansion factors will be set to zero with only 11 =e . In the event of bankruptcy 
proportional costs b  to the value of the firm are incurred. Priority rules for debt holders 
in case of default need also to be specified.  Here both absolute priority (APR) and pari-
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passu  (PPR) rules are considered. Under APR of the early debt issues debt holders value 
i at time t , itD , in case of default is specified by
6:  
 
                                    [ ]tutt DtRVbD 111 ~,)1(min +D−=  
                                                                                  (1a) 
                                  ]~,)1min[(
1
1
jtj
j
i
it
u
tjt DtRDVbD +D−−= ∑
−
=
,    j = 2,….S 
 
where itD
~  denotes the expected continuation value for debt issue i in case the firm does 
not default at t calculated as rdtldttuhdttuit eDpDpD
−
++ −+= ))1((
~
,, .  In the case of PPR 
debt value j in the event of bankruptcy is determined by:  
 
                                       utS
i
it
jt
jt Vb
D
D
D )1(
1
−⋅












=
∑
=
,          j =1,2,…S.                           (1b) 
 
A standard formulation of the lattice parameters for the up and down jumps and the up 
and down probabilities (see Cox, Ross and Rubinstein, 1979) requires that dteu σ= , 
u
ed dt 1== −σ , 
du
dep
dtr
u −
−
=
− )( d
, ud pp −= 1 , where 
F
F
N
Tdt =  , δ is an opportunity cost 
parameter and r denotes the interest rate, which is employed for discounting. We keep 
track of the following information at each node of the binomial tree: unlevered assets 
                                                 
6 More formally, the above rule defines a first-come/first-serve rule where the priority is defined by the debt issue 
which came first.   
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( UV ), tax benefits of debt (TB), bankruptcy costs ( BC ), equity (E), debt issues 
( ,..., 21 DD ) and levered firm value (
LV ). 
Cash inflows (revenues) and outflows (costs and interest payments), as well as 
default or continuation decisions, occur every time step tD . tD  can be controlled by a 
variable decN  that specifies the number of decision points within each unit period.
7 Let 
the corporate tax rate be denoted by τ >0.  We describe the model under the full loss 
offset tax scheme. Under a no loss scheme firms do not pay any taxes unless the earnings 
after interest payments is positive (see also Leland, 2007). Results are not materially 
changed under the no loss scheme. At the end of the operational phase FT  equity and the 
other variables are calculated as follows: 
 
                          





−D−−−= ∑∑
==
0,)1)((max
11
S
i
debt
ii
S
i
debt
iiTT IFtIRCPE FF τ                   (2a) 
                                
where debtiI  is an indicator that takes the value 1 if debt issue i  has not expired and zero 
otherwise.8  
 
If 0>
FTE , then  
tCPV
FF T
u
T D−−= )1)(( τ  
tIRTB
S
i
debt
iiTF D



= ∑
=1
τ     
                                                 
7 Thus, Δt = 1/Ndec. Each Δt interval is approximated by a sub-tree NΔt. To maintain accuracy discounting occurs for 
the interval dt = Ti/Ni. In principle, the decisions can be made as dense as possible approximating the continuous 
decision limit when Ndec tends to infinity.   
8 This requires that we keep track of elapsed time for each debt issue.  
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0=
FTBC                                              (2b) 
                                    iiiT FtRD F +D=   
∑
=
+=
S
i
debt
iiT
L
T IDEV FF
1
, 
otherwise if 0=
FTE
9 (i.e., bankruptcy occurs): 
tCPV
FF T
u
T D−−= )1)(( τ  
0=
FTTB                                                                                      (2c)      
u
TT FF bVBC =  
FFF TT
L
T DEV += .  
 
Debt values at maturity in the event of default depend on the priority rule. In the case of 
APR: 
 
                                             [ ]111 ,)1(min FtRVbD UTT FF +D−=                                      (2d) 
            ],)1min[(
1
1
jj
j
i
iT
u
jT FtRDVbD FF +D−−= ∑
−
=
,  j = 2,….S 
                                                                                 
In the case of PPR:  
 
                                              UTS
i
iT
Ti
Ti F
F
F
F
Vb
D
D
D )1(
1
,
, −⋅












=
∑
=
                                        (2e) 
                                                 
9 If the value of unleveled assets turns negative then the value of all variables are set to zero. 
14 
 
Prior to the maturity of the operational phase (and after all investments have taken place) 
the values of each of these variables are calculated as follows: 
 
 





+D−−−= ∑
=
0,~)1)((max
1
t
S
i
debt
iitt EtIRCPE τ                        (3a)                                 
 
If  0>tE , then 
 utt
u
t VtCPV
~)1)(( +D−−= τ  
tt BCBC
~
0 +=                                                                                (3b) 
t
S
i
debt
iit TBtIRTB
~
1
+D




= ∑
=
τ    
tiiit DtRD ,
~
+D=  
∑
=
+=
S
i
debt
iitt
L
t IDEV
1
, 
whereas, if  0=tE  then 
 
u
tt
u
t VtCPV
~)1)(( +D−−= τ  
u
tt bVBC =                                                                                     (3c) 
0=tTB  
∑
=
+=
S
i
debt
iitt
L
t IDEV
1
, 
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where tx~  denotes the expected discounted value of variable x and equals 
rdt
ldttuhdttut expxpx
−
++ −+= ))1((~ ,,  .  Debt values are determined similarly depending on 
the priority structure. Under APR expression (1a) can be applied, while for the case of 
PPR one would use equation (1b) for each debt value. For points within the lattice not 
involving a decision to default or not, which are used for increased accuracy, the values 
of each variable are the discounted expected values of the variables of the following 
period.   
At the maturity of each investment option stage i occurring at time t, where t  
takes values according to the specified investment maturities, the levered firm value 
includes the equity value plus the amount of debt received at i  plus the expected present 
values of debt raised in the future minus the total cost which includes the investment paid 
at stage i  and the expected present value of the costs to be paid in the future: 
                                  
]0),~(max[
]0),~(~max[
1
11
∑
∑∑
+=
+=+=
+−−+=
+−++=
S
ik
kitt
u
t
S
ik
ki
S
ik
ktitt
L
t
IIBCTBV
IIDDEV
                                 (4)                                           
 
By recursively applying expression (4) at each investment stage i , all investment stages 
are optimized. Expression (4) takes into account the current value of equity tE  and debt 
itD  and the current investment costs iI .  The current value of equity and debt takes into 
account the future optimization by equity holders of the default trigger as can be seen by 
expressions (3a) and (3b). The present value of future debt issues (denoted by ∑
+=
S
ik
ktD
1
~ ) is 
in expected terms (i.e., it is a probability weighted of each of the future debt values) and 
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thus considers the possibility of default and that some or all of the future investment 
options will not be exercised. Similarly, the term ∑
+=
S
ik
kI
1
~  denotes the expected present 
value of investment costs and thus takes into account the future optimization of 
investment stages.  
For example, in the first investment stage and assuming two stages only, the 
condition at the maturity of the investment stage would be: 
 
                                
]0,~max[
]0,~~max[
21
21
111
2111
IIBCTBV
IIDDEV
TT
u
T
TTT
L
T
−−−+=
−−++=
 
 
while at the second stage the condition at investment becomes: 
 
                              
]0,max[
]0,max[
2
2
222
222
IBCTBV
IDEV
TT
u
T
TT
L
T
−−+=
−+=
 
Bankruptcy in periods between investment stages (and prior to the final 
investment) is triggered when the earnings net of cost and coupon payments plus the 
expected levered firm value (which includes expected equity value, expected cash 
received by debt issues and expected costs to be paid) are negative. Thus, the bankruptcy 
condition for any time t prior to the last investment stage is:  
 
                          





+D−−−= ∑
=
0,~)1)((max
1
L
t
I
i
debt
iit
L
t VtIRCPV τ                                  (5) 
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If 0>LtV  then the values at that stage are calculated as in expressions (3a) and (3b) 
while in case of bankruptcy using equations (3c) and (1a) (or 1b in the case of PPR).  
The values at t = 0 are obtained by maximizing expression (5) using an exhaustive 
forward-backward search procedure that evaluates all combinations of coupons at the 
different stages and states of the revenue variable.  The optimal value of the firm at time 
zero involves the sum of the expected present value of equity, the expected present value 
of all debt issues minus the expected present value of the investment costs. This is 
equivalent to the expected present value of the unlevered assets plus the expected present 
value of the tax benefits minus the expected present value of bankruptcy and the 
investment costs. Finally, in order to evaluate leverage ratios, the proportion of initial 
debt value over firm value (adding back investment costs) can be calculated (Lev1).  
 
3. Numerical results and discussion 
 
3.1. Long term debt  
 
In this section we investigate the case of long term debt where the early debt issue 
horizon interacts with the subsequent debt issue. In all numerical simulations we adopt 
APR of the first debt issue. Results are not materially altered with PPR, with only slight 
increases in the second debt issue value.10  
                                                 
10 In general, our investigation reveals that firm values exhibit small oscillations between small and larger number of 
lattice steps. This is particularly important since the differences between 12 and 24 steps do not exceed 3.6% and are 
not affected by the volatility used (results available upon request). As pointed out by the analysis of Broadie and Kaya 
(2007) and Agliardi and Koussis (2011) working with lattice models in a similar context debt values and leverage ratios 
exhibit larger oscillations. As pointed out in these papers debt values are oscillatory because the approximation of the 
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In Table 1 we first observe a U-shape pattern of firm values as a function of 
volatility for relatively out-of-the-money options.11 This result is due to the trade-offs 
involved: a higher volatility increases the option value on unlevered assets (defined as the 
difference between VU and Inv2 in the table) but reduces the net benefits of debt (tax 
benefits minus bankruptcy costs). This result is similar to the one-stage investment 
problem with one debt issue (e.g., Mauer and Sarkar, 2005). If the firm’s revenue levels 
are high (in-the-money case), then an increase in volatility not only hurts the net benefits 
of debt, but also increases the probability of ending up in the out-of-the-money range, 
resulting in a monotonic decrease in firm value.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
It is a well-known result that a low volatility enhances debt values when the firm is at the 
investment trigger and no future investment stages follow (see for example, Leland, 
1994). However, in the multistage investment setting analyzed here, the first debt issue 
increases with volatility (see the out-of-the-money case) since another investment stage 
follows. Furthermore, the initial debt expires after the maturity of the second investment 
stage, which creates an option effect. As a result, an increase in volatility results in the 
firm borrowing more heavily initially since the option value of repaying the remaining 
                                                                                                                                                 
default boundary is particularly important. Our approach based on sub-lattices emerging from each end note of a 
particular investment and financing stage shows similarities with an adaptive mesh approach (see Figlewski and 
Gao,1999) which improves the accuracy in barrier options and allows us to draw important conclusions discussed 
below. 
11 We loosely define moneyness by comparing firm values in the case  P = 10 and P = 30. One can calculate the 
implied value of unlevered assets (without default). When P = 10 then V = 10 (1-0.35)/0.06 = 108.33 while V = 30 (1-
0.35)/0.06 = 325 when P=30. The investment costs add up to 100. Thus the expressions  “out-of-the-money” –“in-the-
money” refer to the case where the firm is less likely – more likely - to exercise its investment options. In our example, 
P=30 describes the “in the money” case, while P=10 the “out-of-the money” case.  
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debt (and obtaining remaining tax benefits net of bankruptcy costs) is now higher. This 
option effect is more important for the low revenue (out-of-the-money) case since a 
higher volatility makes the option ending up in-the-money more likely. We also observe 
that initial coupon levels are also increasing in volatility for the out-of-the-money case. 
 
On the other hand, when initial revenues are high (the option is more in-the-money), a 
low volatility implies a lower bankruptcy risk, while also maintaining a high probability 
that the option stays in-the-money. This allows the firm to borrow more heavily at low 
volatility levels and thus as the volatility increases debt levels and leverage decrease. 
However, at high volatility levels the option effect highlighted above appears to dominate 
and thus we have an increase in initial debt levels and leverage Interestingly, coupon 
levels also have a U-shape for the high revenue case. This U-shape holds also in Leland 
(1994) in the absence of growth options. In sum, with respect to leverage ratios, we 
observe that the proportion of the initial debt in firm value as described by Lev1 is 
increasing in volatility for low revenue (out-of-the-money options) and may have a U-
shape for high revenue (in-the-money options). 
 An increase in volatility causes a decrease in second debt values since there are no 
more stages remaining which would create a similar option effect as in the case of initial 
debt issue. Simulations also show that a higher volatility results in a decrease in the 
probability of exercising the second stage investment. This is indicated by the lower 
expected present value of the second stage costs, which decrease for both the out-of-the-
money and the in-the-money case.  
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 Additional sensitivity analysis is also conducted with respect to other model 
parameters. Table 2 shows sensitivity results with respect to the opportunity cost δ, the 
expansion factor e2 and the investment cost of the second stage I2.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Panel A shows that a higher competitive erosion parameter δ (i.e.,  lower revenue growth) 
results in a reduction in firm value and lower debt levels used both at the initial and the 
second stage. Leverage ratios are slightly decreasing in the level of the competitive 
erosion parameter δ.12 Panel B shows that a higher expansion factor e2 for the second 
stage investment results in an increase in firm value and an increase in the initial and 
subsequent debt values. Lev1 presents a U-shape in the expansion factor e2. Panel C 
shows sensitivity with respect to the level of the second stage investment cost I2. A higher 
second stage investment cost I2 results in a decrease in firm values. The initial debt levels 
decrease when the investment cost is low but at higher levels of the investment cost the 
initial debt level may even exhibit an increase. The U-shape of leverage with respect to 
growth options implies that for relatively low growth options the higher risk levels 
enhance equity values more than debt and as the options become more in-the-money the 
lower risk levels following the exercise of a high growth option enhance debt and 
leverage. Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) have shown a similar result using a perpetual 
horizon for debt.Our analysis differs in two main aspects. First, our analysis allows for 
finite debt horizon and secondly we fix investment timing whereas Hackbarth and Mauer 
                                                 
12  The small decreases in leverage ratios at high levels of δ also appear also in the Leland (1994) no-
growth framework. Due to the numerical nature of the solution these decreases are hard to capture for the 
higher levels of δ in which case our numerical solution shows that leverage ratios are almost unchanged.  
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(2012) allow equity holders to select the timing of investment. In the absence of 
investment timing, we similarly find a U-shape in the case of multiple debt issues 
outstanding with finite long-term maturity. Our analysis with finite debt maturities allows 
us to investigate other possible cases that are not possible in the Hackbarth and Mauer 
(2012) setting. As it is shown in the subsequent section the U-shape relationship between 
leverage and growth options does not appear in the case of short-term debt issues which 
have no interaction in their debt horizons. In that case a negative relationship between 
growth options and leverage prevails. Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) analysis has shown 
that a negative relationship between growth options and leverage may appear when there 
are agency conflicts between debt and equity holders. Our result shows an additional 
factor where such a negative relationship may be possible in the absence of agency 
conflicts when debt maturity is short-term.      
 
3.2. Short term debt  
 
In this subsection we focus on the short term debt case. Table 3 presents sensitivity 
results with respect to volatility for the unconstrained case with short debt maturity for 
both debt issues  (TD1 = TD2 = 5). For the short term debt case, we observe that the firm 
optimally selects high coupon levels which exceed current revenue levels. This implies 
that debt financing constraints may become more binding. We also observe that initial 
equity value (net worth) is negative (seen as the difference between firm value and the 
sum of debt net of the present value of investment costs). This is because of the high 
coupon and debt levels. Firm values are higher than the long term debt case for all levels 
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of volatility and for different levels of moneyness. This is confirmed in further detailed 
tests of debt maturity choice we performed, which show that short term debt is optimal 
for both debt issues. It is also in keeping with an earlier result of Agliardi and Koussis 
(2013) for a single debt issue, showing that for bank loans (with no principal payment) 
short term maturity is preferred.  In contrast, when principal is due, long-term maturity 
for debt is optimal (see also Leland and Toft, 1996). This is also consistent with empirical 
evidence by Altman, Gande and Saunders (2010) and Rauh and Sufi (2008), who find 
that loans have typically shorter maturity than bonds, and McKay (2003) who finds that 
firms relying more on shorter term loans have higher leverage (although he relates this to 
agency reasons).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
In contrast to the long term case, we observe that the U-shape in firm value with respect 
to volatility for the low revenue (out-of-the-money) case does not appear. Indeed, with 
short term debt the firm value is higher (more in-the-money) for the same level of 
revenue, and so a decreasing relationship between volatility and the firm value is 
observed (similar to the in-the-money case for long term debt). Now debt values are 
strictly decreasing in volatility. Despite the decrease in debt values, we still observe, like 
in the case of long-term debt, that the coupon level and leverage ratios (Lev1) are 
increasing in volatility for the low revenue (out-of-the-money option) case. Finally we 
observe that since now the initial debt expires before the exercise of the second stage 
investment, there are no remaining net benefits accruing and thus the above mentioned 
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option effect relates to the unlevered assets only (indeed, the value of unlevered assets net 
of the expected investment cost of stage 2 is increasing in volatility).  
 
For the in-the-money case we observe that the negative relationship between firm value 
with volatility remains. Furthermore, we now observe coupon values that are decreasing 
in volatility and leverage ratios are decreasing in volatility (no U-shape appears as in the 
case of long-term debt). One can observe that high coupon values often exceeding double 
the value of current revenue levels (P = 30). Thus, such high coupon levels may not be 
realistically possible in practice (our analysis in the following section explores this issue 
further by exploring financing constraints). 
  We also summarize sensitivity results with respect to the other parameters. 
Similarly to the long-term debt case an increase in the level of competitive erosion δ 
results in a decrease in the use of initial and subsequent debt and a reduction in firm value 
(results not shown for brevity). An increase in the expansion factor e2 results in an 
increase in firm value and in the initial and subsequent debt levels. Interestingly however, 
and in contrast to the case of long term debt case, Lev1 is strictly decreasing in the level 
of the expansion factor e2 as it is shown in Figure 2  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Our numerical results have also shown (also not shown for brevity) that a higher level of 
the investment cost I2 results in a reduction in firm value and the use of both initial and 
subsequent debt levels and a strictly decreasing leverage ratio (Lev1).   
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Thus, in contrast to the long-term case where debt maturities interact, an increase in the 
value of growth options (increase in the expansion factor or decrease in growth option 
investment costs) increases equity more than debt resulting in a decrease in leverage 
ratios. This result appears in line with the argument of Myers (1977) that short-term debt 
may alleviate underinvestment and thus enhance the value obtained by equity holders 
since equity holders have more flexibility in optimizing their capital structure depending 
on the prospects of their growth options. This allows equity holders to increase debt in 
absolute terms; however, the value increase in equity reduces leverage ratios.   
 
Table 4 provides a summary of model main predictions in the case of no financing 
constraints about firm value and leverage.   
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
3.3. The effect of financing constraints 
 
In this section we investigate the effect of financing constraints. Debt constraints are 
modeled by limiting the possible coupon level at each borrowing date to be a fraction of 
the revenue level at the time of debt issue. This is a particularly reasonable assumption 
especially for bank loans since banks normally take into consideration that the coupon 
(installment) is only a fraction of the revenue level to limit liquidity risk and default. We 
thus define debt financing constraints by setting cmax < cpoints thus limiting the possible 
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level of coupon at the time of debt issuance (see the expression in section 2 defining 
coupon grids).  
The modeling of equity financing constraints is more involved. First, note that in 
the unconstrained case, the bankruptcy trigger decision between investments stages 
described in expression (5) allows that equity value between stages becomes negative, 
implying the possibility of a negative equity net worth. In these stages, equity holders 
base their decision on the total levered firm value that includes the expected value of debt 
raised at the next debt issue.13 With no constraints on equity net worth, equity holders 
may optimally choose to continue even if the component reflecting the value of equity is 
negative. After the final investment is completed the model becomes similar to Leland 
(1994) in that equity holders will only continue if equity is positive (since there is no 
ability to raise more debt in the future). We investigate the case where equity holders face 
constraints where equity net worth remains non-negative at all times, i.e., 0≥tE . We 
note that this condition differs from the equity financing constraints of Yang (2011). Our 
condition still allows that equity holders finance part or all of the investment cost at the 
time investments take place. This condition also allows the infusion of cash by equity 
holders, which implies equity dilution is still possible (see also Broadie and Kaya, 2007, 
Proposition 1) in the in-between investment stages. However, equity infusion in the case 
of non-negative equity net worth constraints can only occur if the condition of positive 
net worth is satisfied, otherwise default is triggered. This type of constraints may reflect 
difficulties in raising new external finance in the case where the firm is not performing 
well (see for example, Hubbard and Kashyap, 1992).  
                                                 
13 This approach corresponds to Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) (see also Mauer and Sarkar, 2005) first-best 
approach of total firm value maximization that does not consider agency problems between equity and debt 
holders.  
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Sensitivity results are presented only for the short-term case, where the selected 
high initial coupon levels make equity net worth constraints more prevalent. Our goal is 
to investigate whether the presence of this type of financing constraints can have an 
important impact on firm values so as to induce the firm to choose long term instead of 
short term debt which as we have shown appears the preferred choice in the absence of 
constraints.    
Table 5 shows sensitivity results with respect to volatility when the firm faces 
non-negative equity net worth constraints. We first observe that despite the negative 
impact on firm values of non-negative equity net worth constraints (compared to the 
unconstrained values of Table 3), firm values remain larger than the long term case 
(Table 1). Thus, non-negative equity net worth constraints may be insufficient in 
justifying the use of long term debt.  
 We also observe some new results with respect to volatility. For both the low 
initial revenue (out-of-the-money) and the high initial revenue (in-the-money) cases, an 
increase in volatility reduces firm values by reducing the value of unlevered assets and 
the tax benefits of debt.  
Under non-negative net worth constraints, firms issue less debt initially in order to 
avoid distress and thus behave conservatively (compare initial leverage levels with the 
unconstrained case of Table 3). This is consistent with the empirical observation that 
firms with growth opportunities are not highly leveraged (Graham, 2000, Billett et al., 
2007 and DeAngelo et al., 2010), providing a possible explanation for the conditions 
under which growth firms borrow conservatively.  
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 6 shows the results in the presence of debt financing constraints. Under a moderate 
constraint, where coupon levels cannot exceed 75% of revenue levels at each debt issue, 
we find that debt constraints for both the low revenue (out-of-the-money) and the high 
revenue (in-the-money) cases are binding, resulting in the maximum allowable coupon 
being used. Firm values are significantly reduced compared to the unconstrained case of 
Table 3. With stricter debt financing constraints firm values become smaller than with 
long term debt (Table 1), thus justifying the use of long term debt. 
 
The following observations regarding volatility also arise. In the low revenue case, an 
increase in volatility increases firm value. This result is caused by an increase in the 
option value of unlevered assets (value of unlevered assets net of expected costs). In this 
case a higher volatility helps alleviate the impact of financing constraints by countering 
the reduction in the tax benefits of debt with an increase in option value on unlevered 
assets. Our results regarding volatility, firm values and investment have important 
implications for empirical studies relating volatility with investments (e.g., Caballero and 
Pindyck, 1996, and Leahy and Whited, 1996). As pointed out in Boyle and Guthrie 
(2003), the debate on the sensitivity of investments to volatility and firm financial 
constraints has often inconclusive empirical results.14 Our model provides an avenue for 
understanding these inconclusive results. First, even in the unconstrained case, we show 
that for firms with long-term debt and low profitability a U-shape may exist between 
                                                 
14 See also Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), (2000) and Kaplan and Zingales (2000). Boyle and 
Guthrie (2003) suggest that liquidity (financing) uncertainty interacting with payoff uncertainty may be the 
cause of these inconclusive results.   
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volatility and firm value, whereas for short term debt or/and high revenue firms there is 
negative relationship. Furthermore, our analysis of constrained firms shows that for 
equity net-worth constrained firms an increase in volatility results in a decrease in firm 
values and thus investment, whereas for debt financing firms an increase in volatility 
enhances firm value.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Further observation of Table 6 also reveals that both the initial and subsequent debt 
values are decreased but Lev1 remains rather flat as a function of volatility.  
In the high revenue case, an increase in volatility has little impact on firm value when the 
firm faces debt financing constraints. This occurs because both the value of unlevered 
assets and the net benefits of debt remain rather unaffected by volatility.   
 In comparison with the unconstrained case, the percentage drop in value is more 
substantial for the low revenue firms. Furthermore, debt financing constraints at this 
plausible level of constraints (where coupons cannot exceed 75% of the revenue levels at 
the time of the new debt issue) appear more significant than equity positive net worth 
constraints. This is in line with Yang (2011) who finds empirical support of a stronger 
impact of debt financing constraints. Overall, the prevalence of these financing 
constraints are expected to be more severe in times of crises which drive firm revenues 
down and reduce available external financing. Thus, our framework provides important 
insights on the effect and significance of the impact of financing constraints on firm 
29 
 
values and the economic activity. The significant impact of debt financing constraints 
also provides a plausible justification for the use of long-term debt.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
One of the main implications of this paper is to use a dynamic investment options model 
to show that firm value is maximized when debt maturity is short. However, with short 
term debt firms would optimally borrow more heavily and are thus more likely to face 
financing constraints compared with long term debt. We investigate the plausible 
explanation of firms using long term debt due to non-negative equity net worth 
constraints and debt constraints. We show that debt financing constraints have a more 
significant impact on firm values compared to non negative equity net worth constraints, 
thus providing a more plausible explanation for firms using long term debt to alleviate 
these constraints.  
The paper also produces some interesting implications on the effect of volatility on firm 
values and corporate capital structure. With long term debt expiring after the maturity of 
investment stages, we show that volatility may actually enhance leverage. We explain 
that this is due to an option value of obtaining tax benefits accruing following an 
investment stage.  Firm values may follow a U-shape with volatility, a result that 
confirms other literature results employing a single investment stage. Furthermore, 
volatility may actually enhance firm values in the presence of debt financing constraints. 
However, in the presence of non-negative equity net worth constraints, an increase in 
volatility hurts firm value. 
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 Figure 1:  A graphical illustration of the forward-backward algorithm for multi-
stage investment issues with multiple debt issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Leverage ratio and growth options: short term debt 
 
The model with no equity or debt constraints is used. Base case parameters are: P =10, C = 0, risk-free rate r = 0.06, 
volatility σ = 0.2, competitive erosion δ = 0.06, investment cost I1 = 50,  I2 = 50,b = 0.5, tax rate τ = 0.35 and T1 = 0, T2 
= 5 (time of second option relative to the first),  TF = 20 and debt maturity TD1 = 5 and TD2 = 5 assuming zero principal. 
An optimal coupon is chosen based on  nc =20 discretization points for each price level with maximum coupon level 
points being equal to twice the price levels (cmax = 40). In all tables Ndec = 1 (yearly decisions) with NΔt = 24 steps per 
year. Initial (t = 0) expansion factor e1=1 (no expansion) and second stage expansion factor e2 is varied in the 
numerical simulations.  
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Table 1. Long-term debt with debt interactions: Sensitivity to volatility 
 
Low revenue (P =10) (Out-of-the-money case) 
 Firm  VU TB BC Debt 1  Debt 2 Inv1 Inv2 Coupon1 Lev1 
σ = 0.10 11.431 77.510 19.580 1.385 17.557 39.772 50 34.273 1.5 0.18 
σ = 0.20 8.122 64.171 14.948 1.743 24.712 19.738 50 19.254 3 0.32 
σ = 0.30 9.852 62.883 13.999 2.094 24.921 17.169 50 14.937 3.5 0.33 
σ = 0.40 13.131 61.555 15.728 3.466 33.889 14.514 50 10.686 6 0.46 
 
 
High revenue (P =30) (In-the-money case) 
 Firm  VU TB BC Debt 1  Debt 2 Inv1 Inv2 Coupon1 Lev1 
σ = 0.10 219.464 238.614 73.664 6.318 140.302 76.483 50 36.495 12 0.46 
σ = 0.20 199.632 234.084 57.494 8.306 97.100 75.473 50 33.640 9 0.34 
σ = 0.30 191.659 230.086 51.183 9.896 86.003 70.129 50 29.715 9 0.32 
σ = 0.40 188.034 218.655 53.130 12.985 108.592 56.192 50 20.766 15 0.42 
 
Notes: The model with no equity or debt constraints is used. Base case parameters are: P =10 (out-of-money) or P = 30 (in-the-
money), C = 0, risk-free rate r = 0.06, volatility σ = 0.2, competitive erosion δ = 0.06, investment cost I1 = 50,  I2 = 50, b = 0.5, tax 
rate τ = 0.35 and T1 = 0, T2 = 5 (time of second option relative to the first),  TF = 20 and debt maturity TD1 = 20 and TD2 = 15 
assuming zero principal. Initial (t = 0) expansion factor at T1 is e1=1 and subsequent expansion factor at T2 is e2=0 (no expansion-
growth).  An optimal coupon is chosen based on  nc =20 discretization points for each price level with maximum coupon level 
points being equal to the price levels (cmax = 40). In all tables Ndec = 1 (yearly decisions) with NΔt = 24 steps per year. Lev1 exhibits 
oscillations inherent in a numerical lattice based approach and is reported to see the general trend.   
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Table 2. Long-term debt with debt interactions: Sensitivity with respect to the level 
of competitive erosion δ, the expansion factor parameter e2 and the investment cost 
I2.  
Panel A. Sensitivity with respect to δ.  
 Firm VU TB BC Debt 1 Debt 2 Inv1 Inv2 Coupon1 Lev1 
δ = 0 83.887 130.019 40.063 4.291 59.372 59.385 50 31.904 5.5 0.36 
δ = 0.02 51.014 104.858 29.350 3.340 41.694 45.502 50 29.853 4 0.32 
δ = 0.04 26.283 82.471 21.395 2.548 32.923 30.754 50 25.036 3.5 0.32 
δ = 0.06 8.122 64.171 14.948 1.743 24.712 19.738 50 19.254 3 0.32 
 
 Panel Β. Sensitivity with respect to e2.  
 
Panel C. Sensitivity with respect to I2.  
 Firm VU TB BC Debt 1 Debt 2 Inv1 Inv2 Coupon1 Lev1 
Inv2 = 0 47.769 79.650 22.858 4.739 51.612 18.437 50 0 5 0.53 
Inv2 = 10 38.920 79.448 19.601 2.942 33.436 25.509 50 7.186 3 0.35 
Inv2 = 20 30.384 77.125 18.886 2.674 31.748 24.885 50 12.952 3 0.34 
Inv2 = 30 22.106 78.028 16.430 2.168 17.018 32.094 50 20.184 1.5 0.18 
Inv2 = 40 14.590 72.407 15.655 1.991 19.786 26.934 50 21.481 2 0.23 
Inv2 = 50 8.122 64.171 14.948 1.743 24.712 19.738 50 19.254 3 0.32 
 
Notes: The model with no equity or debt constraints is used. Base case parameters are: P =10 , C = 0, risk-free rate r = 0.06, 
volatility σ = 0.2, competitive erosion δ = 0.06, investment cost I1 = 50,  I2 = 50, b = 0.5, tax rate τ = 0.35 and T1 = 0, T2 = 5 (time of 
second option relative to the first),  TF = 20 and debt maturity TD1 = 20 and TD2 = 15 assuming zero principal. Except in case B the 
initial (t = 0) expansion factor at T1 is e1=1 and subsequent expansion factor at T2 is e2=0 (no expansion-growth).  An optimal 
coupon is chosen based on  nc =20 discretization points for each price level with maximum coupon level points being equal to the 
price levels (cmax = 40). In all tables Ndec = 1 (yearly decisions) with NΔt = 24 steps per year. Lev1 exhibits oscillations inherent in a 
numerical lattice based approach and is reported to see the general trend.   
 
 
 Firm  VU TB BC Debt 1  Debt 2 Inv1 Inv2 Coupon1 Lev1 
e2 = 0 8.122 64.171 14.948 1.743 24.712 19.738 50 19.254 3 0.32 
e2 = 0.5 40.408 99.412 25.004 3.179 31.945 42.672 50 30.829 3 0.26 
e2 = 1 74.026 125.321 36.057 5.010 53.678 54.352 50 32.342 5 0.34 
e2 = 1.5 108.287 151.677 46.921 6.783 75.804 65.039 50 33.529 7 0.40 
e2 = 2 142.470 178.187 57.178 8.417 93.389 78.394 50 34.478 8.5 0.41 
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 Table 3. Short term debt with no constraints: Sensitivity to volatility 
Low revenue (P =10) (Out-of-the-money case) 
 Firm  VU TB BC Debt 1  Debt 2 Inv1 Inv2 Coupon1 Lev1 
σ = 0.10 42.776 79.275 48.971 2.497 82.289 60.126 50 32.973 16.5 0.65 
σ = 0.20 34.600 74.358 39.691 5.624 71.392 47.635 50 23.826 16 0.66 
σ = 0.30 31.324 71.545 34.110 7.928 69.885 35.501 50 16.402 18 0.72 
σ = 0.40 31.170 70.621 31.914 7.883 66.008 33.057 50 13.481 18 0.70 
 
 
High revenue (P =30) (In-the-money case) 
 Firm  VU TB BC Debt 1  Debt 2 Inv1 Inv2 Coupon1 Lev1 
σ = 0.10 338.994 239.866 186.987 1.516 357.238 178.526 50 36.343 69.50 0.84 
σ = 0.20 308.403 238.949 161.221 9.284 303.839 166.076 50 32.482 62.00 0.78 
σ = 0.30 281.986 235.359 138.317 15.097 273.108 137.182 50 26.594 60.50 0.76 
σ = 0.40 262.135 232.054 120.999 18.964 241.916 122.760 50 21.954 57.50 0.72 
 
Notes: The model with no equity or debt constraints is used. Base case parameters are: P =10 (out-of-money) or P = 30 (in-the-
money), C = 0, risk-free rate r = 0.06, volatility σ = 0.2, competitive erosion δ = 0.06, investment cost I1 = 50,  I2 = 50, b = 0.5, tax 
rate τ = 0.35 and T1 = 0, T2 = 5 (time of second option relative to the first),  TF = 20 and debt maturity TD1 = 5 and TD2 = 5 
assuming zero principal. Initial (t = 0) expansion factor at T1 is e1=1 and subsequent expansion factor at T2 is e2=0 (no expansion-
growth).  An optimal coupon is chosen based on  nc =20 discretization points for each price level with maximum coupon level 
points being equal to the price levels (cmax = 40). In all tables Ndec = 1 (yearly decisions) with NΔt = 24 steps per year. Lev1 exhibits 
oscillations inherent in a numerical lattice based approach and is reported to see the general trend.   
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Table 4. Summary of main model predictions about firm value and leverage 
  Long-term debt Short-term debt 
Variable  Firm Coupon1 Debt1 Lev1 Firm Coupon1 Debt1 Lev1 
 
Volatility (σ) 
Out-of-
money 
U + + + - U or + - + 
In-the-
money 
- U U U - - - - 
Competitive 
erosion (δ) 
 - - - - - - - - 
Growth 
option 
expansion 
(e2) 
 + + + U + + + - 
Growth 
option 
investment 
cost (I2 ) 
 - U U U - - - - 
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Table 5.  Equity non-negative net worth constraints: Sensitivity to volatility 
Low revenue (P =10) (Out-of-the-money case) 
 Firm  VU TB BC Debt 1  Debt 2 Inv1 Inv2 Coupon1 Lev1 
σ = 0.10 31.037 79.813 37.319 1.766 41.641 66.751 50 34.328 8 0.36 
σ = 0.20 26.521 75.918 31.386 4.739 43.397 51.017 50 26.044 9 0.42 
σ = 0.30 25.687 73.651 28.337 3.745 41.104 43.604 50 22.556 9 0.42 
σ = 0.40 24.783 70.621 25.231 5.394 41.002 36.481 50 15.675 10 0.45 
 
 
High revenue (P =30) (In-the-money case) 
 Firm  VU TB BC Debt 1  Debt 2 Inv1 Inv2 Coupon1 Lev1 
σ = 0.10 262.944 239.867 111.901 3.165 117.089 205.792 50 35.659 22.5 0.34 
σ = 0.20 246.437 239.845 97.930 7.525 108.555 178.769 50 33.813 21 0.33 
σ = 0.30 238.636 238.742 90.632 10.115 119.431 149.634 50 30.624 24 0.37 
σ = 0.40 227.516 236.392 81.142 12.759 107.942 136.652 50 27.259 22.5 0.35 
 
Notes: The model with equity constraints (debt unconstrained) is used. Base case parameters are: P =10 (out-of-money) or P = 30 
(in-the-money), C = 0, risk-free rate r = 0.06, volatility σ = 0.2, competitive erosion δ = 0.06, investment cost I1 = 50,  I2 = 50, b = 
0.5, tax rate τ = 0.35 and T1 = 0, T2 = 5 (time of second option relative to the first),  TF = 20 and debt maturity TD1 = 5 and TD2 = 5 
assuming zero principal. Initial (t = 0) expansion factor at T1 is e1=1 and subsequent expansion factor at T2 is e2=0 (no expansion-
growth).  An optimal coupon is chosen based on  nc =20 discretization points for each price level with maximum coupon level 
points being equal to the price levels (cmax = 40). In all tables Ndec = 1 (yearly decisions) with NΔt = 24 steps per year Lev1 exhibits 
oscillations inherent in a numerical lattice based approach and is reported to see the general trend.   
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Table 6.  Debt financing constraints: Sensitivity to volatility 
 
Low revenue (P =10) (Out-of-the-money case) 
 Firm  VU TB BC Debt 1  Debt 2 Inv1 Inv2 Coupon1 Lev1 
σ = 0.10 16.445 78.310 23.245 0.055 38.588 27.882 50 35.055 7.5 0.38 
σ = 0.20 16.565 72.407 21.097 0.540 36.517 24.299 50 26.400 7.5 0.39 
σ = 0.30 18.571 71.545 20.081 1.009 34.908 23.476 50 22.046 7.5 0.39 
σ = 0.40 20.681 70.621 19.077 1.247 33.175 22.577 50 17.770 7.5 0.38 
 
High revenue (P =30) (In-the-money case) 
 Firm  VU TB BC Debt 1  Debt 2 Inv1 Inv2 Coupon1 Lev1 
σ = 0.10 223.994 239.867 71.169 0.000 116.807 86.532 50 37.041 22.5 0.38 
σ = 0.20 223.946 239.779 71.110 0.024 116.736 86.461 50 36.919 22.5 0.38 
σ = 0.30 222.648 238.024 69.682 0.628 114.875 84.844 50 34.430 22.5 0.37 
σ = 0.40 220.579 236.392 66.866 2.025 111.162 81.910 50 30.654 22.5 0.37 
 
Notes: The model with debt constraints (without equity constraints) is used. Base case parameters are: P =10 (out-of-money) or P = 
30 (in-the-money) , C = 0, risk-free rate r = 0.06, volatility σ = 0.2, competitive erosion δ = 0.06, investment cost I1 = 50,  I2 = 50, b 
= 0.5, tax rate τ = 0.35 and T1 = 0, T2 = 5 (time of second option relative to the first),  TF = 20 and debt maturity TD1 = 5 and TD2 = 
5 assuming zero principal. Initial (t = 0) expansion factor at T1 is e1=1 and subsequent expansion factor at T2 is e2=0 (no expansion-
growth).  An optimal coupon is chosen based on  nc =20 discretization points for each price level with maximum coupon level 
points being equal to the price levels (cmax = 15) implying that coupons cannot exceed 75% of revenue (P) level at the time of the 
financing decision. In all tables Ndec = 1 (yearly decisions) with NΔt = 24 steps per year. Lev1 exhibits oscillations inherent in a 
numerical lattice based approach and is reported to see the general trend.   
 
 
 
